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As the term already suggests, political business cycles
should be a phenomenon that is of interest for both
economists and political scientists. In general, political
business cycles are cycles in macroeconomic variables
that have their basis in electoral cycles.2 Both disci-
plines focus on different models for different reasons.
The first model – also labeled the “opportunistic polit-
ical business cycle” – deals with expansionary eco-
nomic activities induced by governments closely
before elections.This model is normally referred to by
economists. Nordhaus’s seminal work (1975) assumed
a typical pattern of policy within a term in office:
“starting with relative austerity in early years and end-
ing with the potlatch right before elections” (Nord-
haus 1975, 187). He was mainly concerned with elec-
tion gifts that seemed to be available from Samuelson
and Solows’ “menu of choice”. According to Samuel-
son and Solows (1960), policymakers are confronted
with a trade-off between inflation and unemployment
(their modified Phillips curve); assuming myopic and
retrospective voters, the opportunistic political busi-
ness cycle model predicts that governments will spur
employment shortly before the next upcoming elec-
tions, accepting a higher inflation rate than is other-
wise considered optimal.3
The second model – known as the “partisan political
business cycle” – goes back to an article by Douglas
Hibbs (1977). The theoretical starting point for the
partisan political business cycle theory is the Phillips
curve again. However, Hibbs assumed that left and
right party leaders have different policy objectives,in
turn leading to different choices from the menu. As
a consequence, Hibbs expected a relatively low un-
employment and high inflation macroeconomic con-
figuration under leftist regimes and the converse con-
stellation under rightist governments (Hibbs 1977,
1471). Under the heading “partisan theory”, this has
been one of the dominant theories in political sci-
ence since the 1980s, mainly applied in welfare state
research but also used in other policy areas.4 One
difference between the opportunistic and the parti-
san political business cycle obviously lies in its tim-
ing: opportunistic behavior should take place in pre-
election years, whereas partisan behavior should be
observed between the tenure of different parties.
Another difference is the respective origin of the as-
sumed patterns of behavior. In the first model, it is
simply the upcoming election day, whereas in the
second model,it is the different party ideologies that
triggers different actions.5
How to test the existence of political business
cycles?
Both models contain some problematic assumptions.
The most obvious one concerns the question wheth-
er politicians are indeed able to influence the econo-
my in the described fashion or if they at least believe
that they can do so.6 The problem with this assump-
tion becomes apparent when considering the politi-
cal and academic career of the Phillips curve. Con-
fronted with the phenomenon of stagflation in the
1970s, theories based on the Phillips curve came in-
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1 This article builds on a chapter in Petring (2010).
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pioneers of the opportunistic political business cycle. For an
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature see, for exam-
ple, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), Drazen (2000) and
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For political scientists, it seems natural to deal with parties’ ideolo-
gies and to ask “do parties matter?”On the other hand,the metho-
dological sophistication of the discipline, availability of macroeco-
nomic data as well as the perception of politicians being mainly dri-
ven by opportunistic motives made the opportunistic political busi-
ness cycle an obvious object of research for economists.
6 I leave aside other questions, related to the assumptions about
voters’ behavior, for example.creasingly under attack from Milton Friedman and
other members of the “Chicago School”.The acade-
mic conflict also had an impact on policies. For the
US,the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981 clear-
ly marked a change in economic policy (“Reagan-
omics”), with a similar tendency observable in many
OECD countries during the 1980s. Therefore, it
should come as no surprise that there is only little evi-
dence for the political business cycle since the 1980s
when it comes to inflation and unemployment rates.
Besides the impact of different economic paradigms
on economic policy, one could additionally raise a
general concern about governments’ ability to di-
rectly and substantially influence unemployment
rates – at least in a free market economy. For similar
reasons, it is questionable to rely on other indicators
that are, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced by
external shocks, such as budget deficits, output and
spending levels.
The above does not hold true, however, for benefit
levels.In contrast to spending levels (which are influ-
enced by unemployment rates) the statutory benefit
levels are direct results of political decisions. Addi-
tionally, in many countries, almost 50 percent of the
electorate is in some way connected to the welfare
state – be it by means of transfers or workplaces
(Flora 1989).This makes social policy a predestined
tool for electoral gifts and an adequate variable for
testing the opportunistic business cycle theory.How-
ever, from the viewpoint of partisan political busi-
ness cycle theory, we should expect a partisan pat-
tern in social policy as well. It should be mainly left-
of-center governments who fall back on expansion-
ary social policy.
In order to test these assumptions, I constructed a
database indicating visible reforms in unemploy-
ment insurance and public pensions in 18 OECD
countries7 from 1980–2002. For pension systems, re-
ductions of pension age, qualifying period and in-
creasing benefit levels serve as indicators for expan-
sionary reforms.8 With regard to benefit levels, infla-
tion-adjusted increases of more than three percent in
relation to the previous year have been coded as
expansions. For the unemployment insurance sys-
tems,reduction of waiting days,extensions of benefit
duration, reduced qualifying periods and increased
benefit levels were used as indicators.In line with the
pension reform indicators, incremental adjustments
have been coded as one reform and any inflation
adjusted increase of more than three percent indi-
cates reforms of benefit levels.9
Applying the above criteria has a major conse-
quence: only visible reforms are covered. By captur-
ing exclusively inflation-adjusted increases of more
than three percent in benefit levels, I do not count
increasing benefits via inflation indexation, for ex-
ample, as a reform. The reason for this is twofold.
First, inflationary adjustments could simply be due
to an automatic indexation rule.Second,they are not
necessarily perceived as an expansionary measure
(which they are indeed not). In order to fulfill its
electoral purpose, policymakers should make sure
that the increase of pension benefits will be noticed
by the electorate. Therefore, the three percent
threshold seems to be reasonable.With these criteria
we are able to identify significant and visible expan-
sionary reforms. The coding followed a simple
dichotomy: 1 for reform, 0 for no reform. Multiple
reforms are coded as one reform.
In order to test the hypotheses, we need additional
data: first, on election years in the 18 countries, and
second, on the governments’ ideological positions.
Information about election years stem from the
WZB Democracy Unit’s Database “Parties, Elec-
tions and Governments” (2008). If the elections
took place in the first six months (June 30),the pre-
vious year has been coded as “election year”
instead of the actual. There are three reasons for
this. First, if expansions are decided upon only one
or two months before the elections, it is very likely
that the opposition parties will blame the govern-
ment for irresponsible policies. Second, govern-
ments ought to be sure that the expansion has been
noticed by the voters. In cases where elections took
place in the first half of a year, expansionary mea-
sures should have already come into effect in the
previous year; and third, because we only have
yearly data about the benefit conditions,if the elec-
tions took place in the very beginning of a year,
expansionary measures might be an inauguration
present of the successor and not a pre-election gift
of the incumbent.
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The ideological position has been identified on the
basis of the programmatic left-right position of the
parties as it is given in the respective election mani-
festos.The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP10)
is based on quantitative content analyses of election
programs of parties from more than 50 countries,
where the parties’ left-right positions are basically
saliency measures of 13 topics. Many other scholars
measure partisanship in terms of two variables: the
share of cabinet seats held by social democratic par-
ties and the share of cabinet seats held by Christian
democratic parties (see, for example, Huber and
Stephens 2001; Swank 2002).This way of measuring
partisanship has two major implications:first,all par-
ties within a party family are treated the same (for
example the French socialists and the British Labour
Party). Second, the ideology of coalition partners is
completely neglected. In contrast to this, with the
CMP data we are able to account for ideological
positions of all governing parties individually for ev-
ery legislative period. In the case of coalition gov-
ernments, the left-right positions of the parties have
been weighted with the respective share of the gov-
ernment’s parliamentary majority. The sum of these
weighted positions is the coalition governments’ ide-
ological position.11
In the following analysis,I will also include the socio-
economic situation under which the respective gov-
ernments acted.In order to operationalize the socio-
economic pressure, I used a combination of Okun’s
and Barro’s misery indices. Okun’s misery index is
simply the sum of unemployment rate and inflation
rate. Barro (1999) included GDP growth rates and
interest rates in addition and calculated the difference
between the beginning and the end of a legislative
period. The modified misery index created here con-
sists of unemployment rates, interest rates, inflation
rates and GDP growth rates on a yearly basis. For
reforms in unemployment insurance, unemployment
rates are weighted by a factor of two. In pension pol-
itics, the pensioners’ ratio has been included. Higher
figures indicate more severe problem pressure.
Are governments opportunistic and does ideology
make a difference?
At first glance, there seems to be no tendency to
place expansionary measures shortly before elections
(Table 1). In both unemployment insurance and pub-
lic pension, the ratio of expansionary reforms is
almost identical to or even slightly below the respec-
tive ratio in non-election years.
Does this picture change if we account for the ideo-
logical positions of the governments? The average of
the ideological center of gravity gives us a first hint.
As can be seen in Table 2, the differences in unem-
ployment insurance between election years with
expansionary measures and those without expan-
sions are negligible. Furthermore, the small differ-
ences are in accordance with our expectations: left-
of-center governments are more likely to increase
generosity of the unemployment schemes than right-
of-center governments. However, when it comes to
pension policy, the differences between the ideologi-
cal centers are larger,and rightist governments seem
more likely to increase pensions before elections.
Table 1 
Share of expansionary reforms in election and







Public pension 32.3  30.1 
Unemploy-
ment insurance 30.0 29.7 
Note: In unemployment insurance, the US has been
dropped because unemployment insurance is under
states’ authority.
  Source: Own calculations.
Table 2 
Ideological center of gravity in election years
Ideological center





of gravity in elec-









Note: In unemployment insurance, the US has been
dropped because unemployment insurance is under
states’ authority.
 Source: Own calculations. 
10 For a detailed description of methods and data see Budge,
Klingemann, Volkens, Bara and Tanenbaum (2001) and Klinge-
mann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald (2006). Recent data
can be downloaded at http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/dsl/Projekte/projek-
te-manifesto.en.htm.
11 Left positions have negative values; right positions take a posi-
tive sign. For the 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2002, the mean
value is 1.7.The minimum value is -36.6 (Finland in 1990),the max-
imum value is 48.5 (Australia in 1990 and 2000).In order to investigate this find-
ing more systematically and to
control for intervening variables,
it is useful to run a logistic regres-
sion. Because there are no rele-
vant differences between elec-
tion and non-election years in
unemployment insurance poli-
cies, I will focus on pension poli-
cies.12 Besides the variables for
election years and ideology, an
interaction effect of the two is in-
cluded in order to check whether
election years indeed change the
“normal” behavior of leftist and
rightist governments.Control vari-
ables are the level of socioecono-
mic pressure and the change of
the socioeconomic pressure in the respective year.To
capture the differences in the political systems, coun-
try dummies have also been included. The model is
not expected to explain the occurrence of expansion-
ary measures in public pension systems in general,but
is used in order to investigate the impact of the most
obvious variables in pension policy (Table 3).13
The two socioeconomic variables both have a signifi-
cant effect on the likelihood of expansionary reforms.
Interestingly, a higher level of socioeconomic pres-
sure increases the likelihood of generous reforms.
Maybe countries that are already in a comparatively
bad situation do not care that much about further
fiscal pressure. However, the actual change of the
socioeconomic problem pressure influences the like-
lihood in the opposite direction. If the economic sit-
uation has improved compared to the previous year,
expansionary reforms are more likely than in a dete-
riorating economic situation. As already expected
from the descriptive tables, both election years and
government’s ideology do not have a strong impact
on the general likelihood of reforms.This is also true
for the interaction effect. Because it is hard to inter-
pret coefficients of logistic regressions when it comes
to interaction effects, I plotted the predicted proba-
bilities for expansionary measures in pension politics
for election years and non-election years over the
full range of governments’ ideological positions.The
level of socioeconomic pressure has been set to its
mean value. In order to simulate election years with
an improving socioeconomic situation,the change of
the misery variable has been set to –10, indicating a
strong improvement (it ranges from
–12.5 to 16.9 in the 18 countries).
In non-election years, pension
expansions are more likely to occur
under leftist governments. The
squared markers resemble partisan
theory’s expectations perfectly.
However, in election years, right-
of-center governments show a
greater tendency to decide upon
expansionary measures in the pen-
sion system. As this is especially
true under improving socioeco-
nomic circumstances, it stands to
reason that those measures are
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Table 3 




impact Level of significance
Election year Negative Not significant (0.86)
Ideological center of gravity Negative Sparsely significant (0.23)
Interaction of election year




Change of misery index Negative Very significant (.002)
Level of misery index Positive Very significant (.002)
Note: Stylized results of a logistic regression with country dummies. De-
tailed results can be reviewed at author’s homepage. 
 Source: Own calculations. 
12 In election and non-election years, the likelihood of expansion-
ary measures in unemployment insurance is greater under leftist
governments than under rightist governments.
13 The model classifies 75.4 percent of the dependent variable cor-
rectly. Sensitivity is 39.7 percent, specificity is 91.9 percent. For
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non-election years
election years
Note: Filled markers represent probabilities that are significantly different (at the .05-level) from the 
average probability.
Source: Own calculations.
PROBABILITY OF EXPANSIONARY MEASURE IN PUBLIC PENSION 
SCHEMES IN ELECTION AND NON-ELECTION YEARS
average probability
probability of pension expansion
ideological center of gravity
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indeed meant to convince voters who are located left
of the government to vote for them.
The fact that pensions are the object of opportunistic
behavior is probably due to its greater number of vot-
ers who benefit from it compared to unemployment
insurance.Additionally, the benefit levels for pension-
ers seem to be less controversial than the benefit lev-
els for unemployed. More puzzling are the findings
with regard to the right-of-center governments’ higher
likelihood of making election gifts.Election gifts serve
mainly the purpose of pulling undecided voters or vot-
ers of other parties to one’s own party.To achieve this
aim, a party must to some extent broaden its image or
blur ideological shortcomings perceived by voters who
normally vote for other parties. In social policy, right-
of-center governments have a neutral or negative wel-
fare image.Therefore it might be a promising electoral
strategy to display a more positive welfare image to
attract new voters. Pension policy is, in contrast to
unemployment insurance policies, not a class-based
policy field.People from almost all societal classes are
beneficiaries.Right-of-center parties can therefore use
expansionary pension policies to attract new voters
without frightening off their own core voters. This
argument is supported by the finding that an improv-
ing economic situation is positively related to the like-
lihood of opportunistic pension reforms: rightist gov-
ernments are able to argue that under the current
good economic circumstances, these expansions can
be justified. By doing this, they keep their image of
being prudent with regard to public spending and
simultaneously appeal to voters left of them. Addi-
tionally, leftist opposition parties will find it hard to
oppose the expansionary measures. For left-of-center
governments,however,expansionary measures shortly
before elections do not serve the purpose of attracting
new voters.Leftist parties already have a positive wel-
fare image. Expansionary social policy will not attract
voters from the right but might in contrast create
fierce critique from opposition parties.14
Conclusion
The findings presented here can be summarized as
follows: we have only weak evidence of opportunis-
tic governmental behavior, it is observable mainly in
pension policy and the partisan pattern behind it is
contrary to theory’s expectations.
What does this mean for research on the political
business cycle theory? If the calculus behind election
gifts is mainly to attract undecided voters or voters
of different parties, party leaders are very likely to
choose policy measures that are not perceived as
being their core concern.When studying opportunis-
tic political business cycles, this means first that
researchers should include parties’ ideological posi-
tions. Second, one should investigate policy areas
where the different ideologies indeed make a differ-
ence for the expected reform trajectories.Because of
almost identical positions of left and right parties, it
is not surprising to find only little empirical support
for the political business cycle theory when it comes
to unemployment and inflation since the 1980s.
And what does this mean for the assumptions behind
the political business cycle theory? Parties might be
opportunistic, but there are also counterincentives.
First, the danger of repelling their electorate by loos-
ening its ideological profile limits parties’ possibilities
of pursuing electoral gifts.Second,the danger of being
blamed by competing parties also narrows the room
for opportunistic behavior.Therefore,two core institu-
tions of democratic regimes that allow the occurrence
of opportunistic behavior also limit it considerably:
elections and contestation by competing parties.
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